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Abutting Owner's Liability for Special Use
of Sidewalk
James H. Stethem*

T

EXAMINES the liability of an abutting land owner or possessor, making special use of a public sidewalk, for injuries received by persons while on the sidewalk. An abutting owner is defined
as "an owner of land which abuts, adjoins or is in close proximity." '
The definition includes the owner or possessor of property which abuts
or adjoins land which legally constitutes a public right of way.2
An abutting owner is generally not liable for the defective condition
of a public sidewalk abutting his property where the defect which resulted in injury to the plaintiff cannot be traced to the defendant abutting owner. 3 The rule has been long established and followed that there
exists no duty on the part of the abutting owner to construct, maintain,
clean or otherwise care for the public sidewalk, absent any statute or
4
ordinance imposing a duty.
The abutting owner is, however, under a duty to maintain his own
premises so that nothing originating on said premises operates to cause
a defect in the adjoining public sidewalk. 5 The duty does not imply an
obligation to keep the public sidewalk free from other defects. 6 The duty
is imposed by reason of the assumption that the abutting owner has the
control of and consequently the responsibility for instrumentalities and
activities on his own premises.7 In the broad sense, any person or corporation creating defects or obstructions in or on a public sidewalk which
wrongfully cause injury to members of the public may be held liable under the doctrine of nuisance."

iSARTICLE

Injuries Resulting from the Accumulation
of Ice and Snow-in General
An abutting owner may be held liable at common law to persons
injured as a result of his wrongful act in accumulating snow or ice on
the public sidewalk. 9 Thus, an abutting owner is liable if he constructs
* B.S., Miami University; Cost Accountant, Ford Motor Co.; Fourth-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Black's Law Dictionary, 26 (4th ed., 1951).
2 Annot., 73 A. L. R. 2d 652 (1960).
3 Massey v. Worth, 39 Del. 211, 197 A. 673 (1938); Le Barre v. Pac. Paper Materials
Co. Inc., 175 Ore. 614, 154 P. 2d 985 (1945).
4 Moore v. City of Columbus, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 136, 139 N. E. 2d 656 (1956).
5 Galiano v. Pac. & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. App. 2d 534, 67 P. 2d 388 (1937).
6 Ibid.
7 Muratori v. Stiles & Reynolds Brick Co., 128 Conn. 674, 25 A. 2d 58 (1942); Steeno
v. Wolff, 14 Wis. 2d 68, 109 N. W. 2d 452 (1961).
8 Greenberg v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 195 App. Div. 509, 186 N. Y. S. 2d 303 (1959).
9 Massey v. Worth, supra n. 2.
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or maintains a structure upon his premises causing an artificial discharge
or accumulation of water upon a public sidewalk which subsequently
freezes and becomes the proximate cause of injury to one lawfully upon
the sidewalk.'
An abutting owner will not be held liable, at common law, for persons injured as a result of natural accumulations of ice and snow.' The
general rule of no liability in the absence of negligence by the abutting
owner is founded on the reasoning that it is the duty1 2 of the municipality
to keep the public sidewalk free from ice and snow.
Liability will not be thrust upon an abutting owner who has violated
an ordinance or statute through his failure to remove ice and snow from
a sidewalk abutting his premises where said ice and snow accumulated by
natural forces. 13 The ordinance or statute is to be viewed as being in
the nature of a public duty and thus will not lend itself to the bringing
14
of a civil action in tort by an individual against the abutting owner.
The municipality cannot relieve itself of its primary duty with regard to
the safety of a public sidewalk. 1
Right to Special Use of a Public Sidewalk
Does an abutting owner have any right under the law to make a
special use of a public sidewalk? Generally, the abutting owner has a
right to a special use, which amounts to an encroachment on the primary
rights of the public, for a limited extent and for a purpose which is temThe abutting owner's right to a special use of a
porary in duration.'
public sidewalk is an incident of ownership not to be denied unless ade7
quate compensation is received by him.'
The measure of the right of an abutting owner to use the public
8
sidewalk for his own convenience or benefit' is that of reasonable in10 25 Am. Jur., Highways § 523 (1940).
11 Massey v. Worth, supra n. 2.
12 McGrath v. Misch, 29 R. I. 49, 69 A. 8 (1908); Therrien v. First Nat'l. Stores, Inc.,
63 R. I. 44, 6 A. 2d 731 (1939).
13 Sewall v. D. Alvin Fox, 98 N. J. L. 819, 121 A. 669 (1923); Swenson v. Lashell, 118
Colo. 333, 195 P. 2d 385 (1948); Donovan v. Kane, 190 Misc. 473, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 462
(1947); Olin v. State of New York, 207 Misc. 610, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 701 (1955); Walley
v. Patake, 271 Wis. 530, 74 N. W. 2d 130 (1956).
14 Annot., 28 A. L. R. 1360 (1924).
15 Steinbeck v. John Hauck Brewing Co., 7 Ohio App. 18, 30 Ohio C. C. Dec. 328
(1916).
16 Brey v. Rosenfeld, 72 R. I. 28, 48 A. 2d 177 (1946), aff'd. on appeal 72 R. I. 316, 50
A. 2d 911 (1947); Lanca v. Central Engineering & Constr. Co., 75 R. I. 365, 66 A. 2d
638 (1949); Barrett v. Union Bridge Co., 117 Ore. 220, 243 P. 93 (1926); Oregon Inv.
Co. v. Schrunk, 81 Ore. 575, 408 P. 2d 89 (1965).
17 Pearsall v. Bd. of Supervisors of Eaton County, 74 Mich. 558, 42 N. W. 77 (1889);
Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., 181 N. Y. 313, 73 N. E. 1108 (1905); Cushing-Wetmore
v. Gray, 152 Cal. 118, 92 P. 70 (1907).
18 R. L. Sabbath v. City of Chicago, 56 Ill. App. 2d 307, 206 N. E. 2d 286 (1965).
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gress and egress under the prevailing circumstances. 19 The right must
be exercised with proper and reasonable care not inconsistent with the
paramount right of the public. 20 The test to be applied is that of reasonableness of use which must balance the public safety with the benefit to
be derived from such use by the abutting owner, 21 or, more specifically,
it may require a balancing of a legitimate business interest with the hazards to the general public using the sidewalk. 22 Because of the property
right concept favoring the abutting owner as to the special use of a public sidewalk, the courts oppose any denial of the right by a state or municipality; unless, as previously mentioned, adequate compensation is
given. 23 An abutting owner was denied the use of a public sidewalk for
the purpose of ingress and egress to his property because the facts revealed that the exercise of such right would create "a real traffic hazard." 24 In the opinion of this writer, the better view taken when a balancing of the interests is involved is to refrain from denying a special
use by the abutting owner merely because such use increases the possibility of danger. 25 The special use is not to be upheld solely on the basis
26
that it is essential to the profitable operation of a business enterprise.
The test of reasonableness of the special use should include all relevant
factors with due consideration being given to each.
A special use of a public sidewalk by an abutting owner in direct
conjunction with his business enterprise, as a driveway for delivery
trucks, was found to be within the general rule of the right of ingress
and egress.2 7 The circumstance of a filling station operator using the
public sidewalk as a means of ingress and egress for his patrons was
found to be proper and reasonable. 28 The right to a special use of a
public sidewalk, thus, extends to the patrons, clients and customers of
an abutting owner.

29

The abutting owner should keep uppermost in mind, when using
a public sidewalk for any private or public purpose, that the primary
19 Deaconess Hospital v. Washington State Highway Commission, 66 Wash. 2d 378,
403 P. 2d 54 (1965); Salem Nat'l. Bank v. City of Salem, 47 Ill. App. 2d 279, 198 N. E.
2d 137 (1964).
20 City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N. E. 2d 278 (1946).
21 R. L. Sabbath v. City of Chicago, supra n. 18.
22 Annot., 73 A. L. R. 2d 652 (1960).
23 Pearsall v. Bd. of Supervisors of Eaton County, supra n. 17; Northern Boiler Co.
v. David, 157 Ohio St. 564, 105 N. E. 2d 451 (1951), aff'd 157 Ohio St. 564, 106 N. E.
2d 620 (1952); Thomas v. Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P. 2d 974 (1951).
24 Alexander v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N. W. 2d 244 (1946).
25 Tilton v. Sharpe, 84 N. H. 43, 146 A. 159 (1929).
26 City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Texas, Inc., 158 Tex. 318, 311 S.W.
2d 218 (1958).
27 City of Evansville v. Cunningham, 202 N. E. 2d 284 (Ind. App. 1964).
28 Brownlow v. O'Donoghue, 276 Fed. 636 (C. A., D. C., 1921).
29 Tilton v. Sharpe, supra n. 25.
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function or reason for the sidewalk is for public travel and the right of
30
special use is secondary or subordinate.
Duty and Care Imposed by Special Use
The abutting owner is under no common law duty to keep the public
sidewalk in repair in absence of his negligence.3 1 When a special use is
involved, the general rule is that the abutting owner is under a duty to
maintain that part of the sidewalk put to his use in a reasonably safe
condition for public use, and the abutting owner is liable for injuries
received by persons as the proximate result of his failure to use reason32
able care to prevent injury to persons lawfully upon the sidewalk.
The fact of the special use itself takes the case from the general rule
of no liability of an abutting owner and creates the exception to the general rule.33 Where the primary action is against the abutting owner and

a special use is not established, there will not be a recovery from the
abutting owner. 34 The courts have held as a general rule that an abutting owner who has a special use in a public sidewalk may become liable
where the abutting owner has created the defective condition or where
his special use has produced the defective condition. 35 The abutting owners liability is not changed where the defect, for which the abutting owner is being charged, was created by an independent contractor hired by
the abutting owner.3" Liability will also attach to the present property
owner although the defect was brought about by the activities of the
previous owner of the property. 37 The court held the test of liability to
be the "capability of the appurtenance" 38 and that the duty was a covenant that ran with the land. 9
The degree of care required of an abutting owner having a special
use in a public sidewalk has been held to be that of the highest vigilance
3 Cooley, Torts 452 (4th Ed. 1932); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 162 P. 2d 371
(1945).
31 Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Harris, 270 Ala. 390, 118 So. 2d 727 (1959).
32 Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N. W. 461 (1911); Granucci
v. Claasen, 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437 (1928); Texas Co. v. Williams, 228 Ala. 30, 152 So.
47 (1934); 63 C. J. S. 225 (1950); Annot., 88 A. L. R. 2d 331 (1963); Lee v. City of
Baton Rouge, 141 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1962), the appellate court reversed as to codefendant municipality; municipality was secondarily liable, 243 La. 850, 147 So. 2d
868 (1963).
33 Kopfinger v. Grand Cent. Public Market, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65, 389 P. 2d 529 (1964);
Lee v. Ashizawa, 37 Cal. Rptr. 71, 389 P. 2d 535 (1964).
34 Goldner v. Wiener, 36 Misc. 2d 741, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 160 (1956).
35 Braithwaite v. Grand Union Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 941, 255 N. Y. S. 2d 924 (1964).
36 Brown v. Gustafson, 264 Minn. 126, 117 N. W. 2d 763 (1962).
37 Hughes v. City of New York, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 446 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd 268 N. Y. S.
2d 985.
30

38

Ibid.

Nickelsburg v. City of New York, 263 App. Div. 625, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1942); Herron v. City of Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24 N. E. 2d 708 (1940).
39
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and care necessary to keep the sidewalk safe for the public, 40 although
this does not mean to keep the sidewalk in perfect condition. 41 The minimum duty of care to which an abutting owner will be held is that of
reasonable care and reasonable prudence to discover any defective condition in the sidewalk but there will be no liability where the reasonably
prudent man would not have anticipated injury to others 42 or where
43
those who use the sidewalk have knowledge of the defective condition.
Establishing a Special Use Sufficient
for Liability to Attach
The elements necessary to constitute or establish a special use of
a public sidewalk, in the view of the law, are by no means settled or
certain. The most definite situation of a special use arises where the
sidewalk has been specifically altered to meet a particular purpose of the
abutting owner. 44 The liability for injuries received as the proximate
result of the special use must rest with either the municipality owning
the sidewalk or with the abutting owner having the special use. The
question of liability revolves around the issue of for whose benefit the
alteration was made. 45 When an abutting owner constructs any opening
or makes any other alteration in a public sidewalk for his own benefit or
convenience he owes a duty to the public.46 The duty of the abutting
owner is created only where he has made the construction or alteration
although the abutting ownand not where the municipality has done so, 47
er may derive a secondary benefit therefrom.
The showing or establishment of a special use is more difficult in
situations void of a specific construction or alteration. The plaintiff in
a leading California case alleged that the defendant abutting owner had
made a special use of the public sidewalk in that the sidewalk was being
used as a driveway for the benefit of the defendant, but not for a business enterprise of the defendant. 4 The court ruled in favor of the defendant abutting owner by finding that the facts of the case did not bring
it within the exception to the general rule and therefore found no liability of abutting owner to plaintiff.49 The gist of the decision is that as
Cool v. Rohrbach, 21 S. W. 2d 919 (Mo. App. 1929).
Degheri v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 136 Misc. 600, 240 N. Y. S. 304 (1930).
City of Grand Forks v. Paulsness, 19 N. D. 293, 123 N. W. 878 (1909); BelkMatthews Co. of Macon v. Thompson, 94 Ga. App. 331, 94 S. E. 2d 516 (1956).
43 Lacy v. Uganda Inv. Corp., 7 Ohio App. 2d 237, 220 N. E. 2d 130 (1964).
44 Monroe, Liability for Sidewalk Structures Placed There by Abutting Owner or
Occupier, 6 Mo. L. Rev. 122 (1941).
45 Ibid.
46 2 Restatement of Torts 230 (1965); Bergley v. Manis, 99 N. W. 2d 849 (Sup. Ct.
N. D. 1959).
47 Watts v. R. A. Long Bldg. Corp., 142 S. W. 2d 98 (Mo. App. 1940).
48 Winston v. Hansell, 160 Cal. App. 2d 570, 325 P. 2d 569 (1958).
49 Ibid.
40
41
42
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a general rule the use of a public sidewalk as a driveway was found to
be an ordinary use and not a special use of the sidewalk. 50 An apparent
distinction has been made between a use for a private purpose and a use
for a commercial purpose. The distinction is that it is more probable that
a special use and the concomitant liability and duty will be found as to
abutting owners operating a commercial establishment as opposed to a
private residence. 51 This poses the unresolved question of whether any
use of a public sidewalk by an abutting owner for a commercial purpose
is therefore a special use.
An abutting owner was found not liable where it was clearly shown
that he was using the public sidewalk as a driveway for customers of his
automobile agency. The rationale of the court was that the public created the defective condition of the sidewalk and only the municipality
had a duty to take the necessary corrective action.5 2 Liability of an
abutting owner has also been denied where the defective condition complained of was caused by a special use, but was either trivial, not inher53
ently dangerous, or was not the proximate cause of the injury.
The abutting owner must be found to have done sufficient acts of
affirmative negligence to warrant a finding of liability. 54 The abutting
owner will not be found liable where plaintiff has failed to establish an
act or series of acts showing affirmative negligence. 55 Liability of the
abutting owner was not established where no acts of affirmative negligence were shown, although the abutting owner had been notified of the
defect and had been requested to make the necessary repairs but had
failed to do so. 56 A mere affirmative act will not establish liability such
as an abutting owner, having a special use in the sidewalk, who attempts
to remove ice and snow from the sidewalk, unless he was negligent in so
doing.57 This principle was applied to a case of an abutting owner who
operated a filling station and used the public sidewalk as a driveway.
The surface of the sidewalk became corrugated due to the traffic of the
abutting owner's customers, but no liability was found because the corrugation was caused naturally as opposed to any acts of affirmative negli50 Citizens Say. Bank of Baltimore v. Covington, 174 Md. 633, 199 A. 849 (1938); City
of Bessemer v. Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 65 So. 2d 160 (1953); Breuer v. Mataloni, 133
N. W. 2d 114 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1965).
51 Breuer v. Mataloni, supra n. 50; Franzen v. Dimock Gould & Co., 251 Iowa 742,
101 N. W. 2d 4 (1960).
52 Adams v. Grapotte, 69 S. W. 2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd. 130 Tex. 587, 111
S. W. 2d 690 (1938).
53 Annot., 88 A. L. R. 2d 331 (1963).
54 Note, Negligence-Liability of an Abutting Owner, 18 Wash. L. Rev. 41 (1943).
55 Bennett v. McGoldrick-Sanderson Inc., 15 Wash. 2d 130, 129 P. 2d 795 (1942);
Den Braven v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 115 N. J. L. 543, 181 A. 46 (1935).
56 Gossler v. Miller, 221 A. 2d 249 (Sup. Ct. N. H. 1966).
57 Abar v. Ramsey Motor Service Inc., 195 Minn. 597, 263 N. W. 917 (1935); Rosenblum v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 300 Mass. 264, 15 N. E. 2d 189 (1938).
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gence being the causation.5" An accumulation of snow, natural in origin,
will not be transformed into an artificial accumulation merely by people
walking upon it, causing it to become compressed. 59 An intervening act
of the abutting owner does not necessarily change a natural accumulation
into an artificial accumulation. The court held it to be a natural accumulation where the abutting owner shoveled snow from his property onto
piles of snow created by municipal snowplows. 60
Affirmative negligence was established by proof that the trucks of
an abutting owner who used a public sidewalk as a driveway, had deposited loose gravel on the sidewalk resulting in injury to plaintiff. 61 The
affirmative negligence coupled with a use resulted in the finding of a
special use and corresponding liability. 62 Time was an important element
in establishing affirmative negligence where the trucks of the abutting
owner had passed over the public sidewalk almost daily for twenty
years. 63 Mere ordinary wear and tear causing a defect in a sidewalk is
not sufficient to hold an abutting owner liable even though the abutting
owner's use of the sidewalk was shown to have been strenuous and "ac64
celerated" ordinary wear and tear.
The courts will generally view the issue of a special use of a public
65
sidewalk by an abutting owner, using the following criteria:
(1) a special use of the sidewalk by the defendant abutting owner,
(2) an allegation of facts showing a defect or hazard in the sidewalk,
(3) the hazard or defect created by an act or omission of the defendant abutting owner in relation to his special use of the sidewalk,

(4) knowledge of said hazard or defect by defendant abutting owner,
(5) injury to plaintiff as a proximate result of the above.
The question of negligence is always for the jury to decide, unless
reasonable men would not differ, and a myriad of factors must be considered to establish a probability and not a mere possibility of harm:66
(1) the condition of other sidewalks in the area and surrounding
areas,
58 Bennett v. McGoldrick-Sanderson Inc., supra n. 55.
59 Rainey v. Harshbarger, 7 Ohio App. 2d 260, 220 N. E. 2d 359 (1963); Debie v. Cochran Pharmacy-Berwick Inc., 8 Ohio App. 2d 275 (decided Nov. 22, 1966).
60 Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 1 Ill. 2d 133, 115 N. E. 2d 288 (1953); Kelley v. Park View
Apts. Inc., 215 Ore. 198, 330 P. 2d 1057 (1958).
61 James v. Burchett, 15 Wash. 2d 119, 129 P. 2d 790 (1942).
62

Ibid.

63
64
65
A.
66

Ford v. City of Shreveport, 165 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1964).
Purdom v. Sapadin, 111 Ohio App. 488, 168 N. E. 2d 558 (1960).
Weinberg v. Wing, 16 App. Div. 2d 900, 228 N. Y. S. 2d 740 (1962); Annot., 88
L. R. 2d 331 (1963).
Note, Sidewalk Defects-Question for Jury, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 592 (1962).
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(2) the cost of maintaining the sidewalk in better condition,
(3) abutting owner's knowledge or notice of the defect in the sidewalk,
(4) weather conditions,
(5) volume of traffic under normal circumstances,
(6) likelihood that the person will traverse the defect by selecting
an alternate route.
Effect of Statute Attempting to Impose Liability
for Failure to Maintain the Sidewalk
The practical result of imposing liability on an abutting owner for
special use of a public sidewalk is to impose liability where it ordinarily
does not exist except for the special use.67 Any statute or ordinance purporting to impose on an abutting owner the duty of maintaining a public
sidewalk, in which he has a special use, is in derogation of the common
law and will be strictly construed. 8
Pennsylvania is the exception to the general rule and holds that an
owner or possessor of abutting property is liable to persons injured as
a result of his failure to maintain the sidewalk. 69 The Pennsylvania law
proceeds to develop decisions from the standpoint of primary liability
with respect to the abutting owner and secondary liability with respect
70
to the municipality.
Licensee or Invitee Owed Any Higher
Duty by Abutting Owner?
The law is well settled that the main duty owed to a licensee by a
possessor of land is that of using reasonable care in warning the licensee
71
upon discovery of any dangerous conditions.
The law is also well settled that the duty owed by a possessor of
land to an invitee is to use reasonable care to make the premises safe for
him or to warn him of those dangers known to the possessor. 72 The duty
exists only while the invitee is upon a part of the premises to which the
73
invitation extends.
Kopfinger v. Grand Cent. Public Market, supra n. 33.
68 Texas Co v. Grant, 143 Tex. 145, 182 S. W. 2d 996 (1944); Dennison v. Buckeye
Parking Corp., 94 Ohio App. 379, 115 N. E. 2d 187 (1953); Sternitzke v. Donahue's
Jewelers, 249 Minn. 514, 83 N. W. 2d 96 (1957).
69 Lohr v. Borough of Philipsburgh, 156 Pa. 246, 27 A. 133 (1893); City of Pittsburgh
v. U. S., 359 F. 2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1966).
70 Koerth v. Borough of Turtle Creek, 355 Pa. 121, 49 A. 2d 398 (1946); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 53 § 1891.
71 Prosser, Law of Torts 445 (1955).
72 Nunley v. Pettway Oil Co., 346 F. 2d 95 (6th Cir. 1965); York v. Murphy, 264 N. C.
453, 141 S. E. 2d 867 (1965); Lorraine v. E. M. Harris Bldg. Co., 391 S. W. 2d 939 (Mo.
App. 1965).
73 Clement v. Bohning, 159 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 1963).
67
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An issue that is not so well settled is whether a public sidewalk in
which the abutting owner has a special use is within the scope of the
invitation so as to constitute a part of the premises.
One view is that an abutting owner is not liable as an invitor to his
invitee for injury sustained by the invitee on a public sidewalk. The
rationale employed in such view is that the municipality has the duty to
the public of exercising reasonable care with respect to persons using
the sidewalk.74 This was held to be the law where an abutting owner
had a special use in a public sidewalk for patrons of his theatre. The
court found that the sidewalk was not a part of the business premises
and hence not within the scope of the invitation. 75 Based on this view
impose
it can thus be stated that situations involving an invitee do not
76
any higher degree of care than is owed to the general public.
The opposing view is that an invitation by an abutting owner carries
77
with it the duty to provide reasonably safe means of ingress and egress.
The general theory states that an abutting owner must keep the approaches to his building safe for his invitees because these approaches
are within his control.78 The rule is conditioned by the requirement of
notice by the abutting owner of any hazard or defective condition. 79 A
bank was held not liable to the plaintiff where proof was given that the
bank had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defect resulting
in injury to the plaintiff.8 0
The Possibility of a New Trend
The reported cases do not indicate the presence of any major
changes in the established rules governing the liability of an abutting
owner as to a special use of a public sidewalk. When an abutting owner
has been found to have a special use of a public sidewalk to further a
commercial purpose it may be advanced that the business proprietor or
operator should bear liability as a risk of doing business, as the cost of
this risk would be passed on to his customers. Such a theory was put
Davis v. West Shore Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 220, 130 P. 2d 459 (1942); Annot., 81
A. L. R. 2d 750 (1962). In Ohio, the municipality has a statutory duty to keep its
public sidewalks open, in repair, and free from nuisance. Anyone on a sidewalk has
74

the right to assume that the municipality has performed its statutory duty, unless
the person has notice to the contrary, as held in Darst v. City of Columbus, 25
Ohio L. Abs. 397 (1937); Moore v. Geiger, 6 Ohio App. 2d 14 (1966).
75 Miller v. Welworth Theatres of Wisconsin, 272 Wis. 355, 75 N. W. 2d 286 (1956).
76 Fallon v. Zara Contracting Co. Inc., 204 Misc. 895, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 731 (1953).
77 Parsons v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 69 Ga. 11, 24 S. E. 2d 717 (1943); Flint River
Cotton Mills v. Colley, 71 Ga. 288, 30 S. E. 2d 426 (1944); Rainey v. Harshbarger, 7
Ohio App. 2d 260, 220 N. E. 2d 359 (1963).
78 Note, Liability of Storekeeper to Customer, 24 Geo. L. J. 1043 (1936); Gilroy v.
U. S., 112 F. Supp. 664 (D. C., D. C. 1953); Blaine v. U. S., 102 F. Supp. 161 (N. D.
Tenn. 1951).
79 Gabriel v. Bank of Italy, 204 Cal. 244, 267 P. 544 (1928).
80 Ibid.
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forth in a case where the attorney for the plaintiff realized that no duty
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the special use, because the defect had been naturally caused and the plaintiff did not allege
any wrongful or illegal use of the sidewalk by the defendant."' The
plaintiff reasoned that the law of sidewalks and their use by the abutting
owners must be viewed in the light of modern selling methods and business operations. Although the court found for the defendant in that case,
the theory advanced by the plaintiff is important in that it attempts to
assert a form of strict liability where the special use involved concerns
a commercial purpose. The theory appears to have a fiber of rationality
based upon the "deep-pocket" concept, but this would, in effect, attach
an even higher duty on an abutting owner to the public than that which
he owes to others, such as business invitees. It can thus be realized that
the courts will continue to require affirmative negligence by the abutting
owner before rendering a finding of liability.
81 Daley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 90 F. Supp. 562 (N. D. Ohio 1950).
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